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ABSTRACT 
ANWER, RAISA Mental Illness: A History with Respect to the Care and Treatment 
of the Mentally Ill, Law and Public Policy, and the Stigma Attached to the 
Affliction.  Department of Psychology, June 2013. 
ADVISOR: Dr. Kenneth DeBono 
This thesis contains the exploration of mental illness starting with how mental illness is 
defined today.  The history of mental illness in America reveals a gross neglect of those afflicted 
with “madness,” as it was usually referred to.  This thesis will focus on the treatment of the 
mentally ill from the 1900s to present day.  There is an inherent stigma attached to mental illness 
and as modern and as civilized as the United States claims to be, it should be noted that mental 
illness is still as much taboo even today, rife with stories of the mentally ill being constantly 
stigmatized for their illness.  This paper will also focus on the representation of mental illness in 
the legal system and how the mentally ill are viewed through the lens of the law, with specific 
insight into the treatment of mental illness with respect to law and public policy in the United 
States from the 1900s to today.  There will be a further discussion of potential healthcare and 
legal reforms that may be instantiated to improve treatment of the mentally ill today so that they 
may live to see a better tomorrow for themselves.  
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Mental Illness: A History with Respect to the Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 
Law and Public Policy, and the Stigma Attached to the Affliction 
Mental illness is among the most difficult and serious quandaries facing the world today 
(Frank & Glied, 2006).  It is especially the cause of much pain and suffering for those afflicted 
with mental illness and the ones who care about them (Gallagher, 2002).  It is important to note 
that the mentally ill are not freaks of nature, as their history of treatment would suggest.  Starting 
from the 1900s, the mentally ill suffered at the hands of public mental institutions, which was in 
effect a result of the public policies regarding the care and treatment of the mentally ill (Deutsch, 
1946).  Suffice it to say, in the first half of the twentieth century, living in a public institution for 
the mentally ill was not something to which any one could look forward.  It was a place that 
reeked of despair and depression, populated by souls worn out from being mistreated by society 
and fighting their own inner demons. (Grob, 1983).  Only toward the latter half of the nineteenth 
century did the situation of the mentally ill, specifically their living conditions in public mental 
institutions, begin to take a turn for the better (Young, 2010).  One critical factor in this turn-
about was the United States’ federal government’s involvement in caring for the mentally ill 
(Reamer, 1989).  Despite sweeping changes that resulted from this involvement of the federal 
government, including better and more readily available care for the mentally ill in public mental 
institutions, the law had not completely advanced in its views of the mentally ill (Bell, 1989).  
Most of the laws detailing the treatment of the mentally ill in criminal trials had originated in the 
1800s.  Not to mention that most of them were more interested in criminal responsibility as 
opposed to mental capacity, understandably so as their goal was to remove these denigrates, as 
indeed that is precisely how they were viewed at the time, from society (Deutsch, 1946).  With 
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respect to commitment laws regarding the mentally ill, many of the commitment laws had 
adverse effects on the care of the mentally ill (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Suffice it to say that 
lawmakers had their own agenda when it came to enacting mental health reform, with many of 
them choosing cutting costs before adequate care for the mentally ill (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The 
mentally ill were not only suffering due to inadequate health care and uninformed laws, they 
were also suffering the effects of constant stigmatization (Corrigan, Roe, & Tsang, 2011).  The 
mass media especially perpetuates a negative view of the mentally ill on the denizens of society 
(Callard et al., 2012).  Those cases involving the rare but violent acts perpetrated by the mentally 
ill are constantly publicized and used as demonstrative of the general population of the mentally 
ill (Gallagher, 2002).   
Definition of Mental Illness 
In order to truly understand mental illness one must first grasp the concept of the 
definition, if indeed there is a set one, of mental illness.  To define abnormalities in mental 
health, one must first define what mental health is.  As the issue surrounds humans, one of the 
most complex beings on Earth, it is not surprising that the topic has generated much debate 
(McNally, 2011).  It is of importance to note, however, that creating an all-encompassing 
description of mental health is almost impossible because there is no general agreement on what 
exactly constitutes “normal” behavior and understandably so, because what may be perceived as 
“normal” in one context, personal or cultural, may not be perceived as normal or acceptable in 
another.  In the early twentieth century, mental health was perceived as a condition of the mind; 
today, it is thought to be a condition afflicting the brain (Gallagher, 2002).  It should be noted 
that different individuals and entities have differing opinions on whether the focus should be on 
the brain or the mind (Callard et al., 2002).  What is significant, however, is that a therapist’s 
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concept of mental health is more important as it can have a far-reaching influence on the 
patient’s general outcome (Gallagher, 2002).   
To diagnose mental illness properly, healthcare professionals follow the handbook 
prepared by the American Psychological Association, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.  According to the most recent version of these guidelines, the DSM-IV-TR 
(text revision), “mental disorders are behavioral or psychological syndromes, clusters of co-
occurring symptoms, which cause significant distress or interfere with a person’s ability to 
function in everyday life, or both” (McNally, 2011, p. 3).  Mental disorders are not confined to 
one specific category but in fact vary in terms of type and severity (McNally, 2011).  Generally, 
there are thought to be four clusters of mental illness.  One of these four clusters involves 
abnormalities in thoughts, sentiments, and interpretations (McNally, 2011).  The second cluster 
is comprised of mental illness conditions that originate when individuals fall on either extremes 
of neuroticism and introversion (McNally, 2011).  Of course, being extremely shy does not 
signal one out for a mental illness but extreme shyness coupled with the individual’s situation in 
life and personal experiences can produce effects, which may inch them closer to developing 
mental illness (McNally, 2011).  According to the psychiatrist Paul McHugh, the third type of 
cluster involves individuals’ behavioral practices which may produce instant so-called positive 
effects for the individual but which may have seriously negative consequences down the road 
(McNally, 2011).  Those suffering from drug addiction issues usually comprise this category.  
According to McNally (2011), the fourth category of mental illness, best illustrated by post-
traumatic stress disorder, usually develops after an individual experiences traumatic events or 
injuries.  Generally, symptoms of mental disorders showcase themselves when there has been a 
dysfunction in the operations of the mind or brain (McNally, 2011). 
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History of the Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill 
As Albert Deutsch (1946) correctly contended, there does not seem to have been any 
consistencies in the procedure involved in taking care of the mentally ill in America.  The 
following research on the treatment of the mentally ill in America will reveal that the care and 
treatment of the mentally ill in the United States showed a horrifying trend before things began 
to change slightly for the better in the late twentieth century (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Prior to the 
1900s, the criminally insane were incarcerated just like other, non-mentally ill, common 
criminals (Deutsch, 1946).  Only in the 1900s did states start building separate facilities to house 
the mentally ill who had transgressed the law (Deutsch, 1946).  The first foray into treatment for 
the mentally ill began in 1902 when the Marine Hospital Service, which was given power to 
constrain domestic epidemics, had a new addition to its name: Public Health Service (Armour, 
1989).  By 1912, the Public Health Service had been granted authority to sanction research into 
and preclude disease (Armour, 1989).   
To aid in improving conditions for the mentally ill, the early twentieth century witnessed 
the rise of the mental hygiene movement, which went beyond just emphasizing the treatment of 
mental illness (Bell, 1989).  The mental hygiene movement in effect focused on early 
intervention, the prevention of increased mental illness in an individual, and the advancement of 
mental health (Grob, 1983).  Whereas before there was no emphasis on prevention, the mental 
hygiene movement went a step further and promoted the treatment and prevention of mental 
illness (Grob, 1983).  This movement sought to paint mental asylums as areas where society hid 
and maltreated the mentally ill as social pariahs.  In effect it associated a stigma with the asylum 
(Bell, 1989).  The movement took off with the establishment of the National Committee for 
Mental Hygiene (NCMH) in New York City in 1909 (Bell, 1989).  It was mainly founded 
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through the efforts of Clifford W. Beers, who himself had endured the horrific conditions that 
mentally ill patients were typically exposed to in mental institutions and which he detailed in his 
book, A Mind That Found Itself (Grob, 1983).  The NCMH raised hopes about improvements in 
the mental health system and mental health policies, as well as new innovations in treatment 
(Bell, 1989).  The stated goals of the NCMH clearly reflected the goal of the hygienist 
movement, namely: “The NCMH would protect the public’s mental health; promote research 
into and dissemination of material pertaining to the etiology, treatment, and prevention of mental 
disease; enlist the aid of the federal government; and establish state societies for mental hygiene” 
(Grob, 1983, p. 153).  Though established so early on, the NCMH would not be functional until 
after 1912 (Bell, 1989).  A major source of its issues lay in financial problems, namely 
insufficient funds to carry out any of its goals or to pay salaries for those it employed (Deutsch, 
1946).  Beers also had a broader agenda than what his collaborators would have liked and even 
with funding from Henry Phipps and the Rockefeller Foundation, the NCMH did not accomplish 
much of what it proposed to do when it was first founded, mainly the improvement of conditions 
for the mentally ill in mental institutions (Grob, 1983).  Despite these issues, perhaps one of the 
biggest contributions of the Committee was its work in modifying the label placed on the 
mentally ill so that it was no longer acceptable to interchangeably use insanity and mental illness 
(Bell, 1989).  The Committee has also printed a journal called Mental Hygiene since 1917 (Grob, 
1983).   
Even with goals that would have no doubt helped the mentally ill a great deal during the 
early 1900s, the foundation was not very successful (Deutsch, 1946).  One of the reasons for its 
perceived failure is thought to be the above-mentioned conflicts between Beers and his 
collaborators, including Adolf Meyers and Thomas W. Salmon, both of whom would resign 
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(Grob, 1983).  Other foundations with hygienist agenda, including John D. Rockefeller’s 
founding of the Bureau of Social Hygiene, are thought to have had more success, though 
admittedly they did not concentrate solely on mental illness (Bell, 1989).  Their focus of social 
change was based on studying and treating venereal disease, prostitution, and analyzing the 
association between moral issues and the law (Grob, 1983).   
With respect to the administrative organization of state hospitals, the beginning of the 
twentieth century saw the rise of state boards of control (Grob, 1983).  The boards of control 
sought to consolidate the state’s independent institutions and replace the governing authorities of 
individual institutions (Grob, 1983).  This move was originally meant to remove responsibility of 
the fiscal costs of caring for the mentally ill from local institutions, and the community in 
general, to the federal government (Grob, 1983).  The rationale behind the creation of the boards 
of control was to increase efficiency in public institutions and withdraw these institutions from 
the influence of politics so that hospitals could easily take care of their patients without being 
hampered by political disputes (Grob, 1983).  It should be noted, though, that this policy was not 
easy to implement in reality because efficiency in institutions with larger populations came at the 
price of overlooking or ignoring, the needs of the patients (Grob, 1983).  Therefore the boards of 
control achieved its goals better at smaller institutions with a more scant population (Grob, 
1983).  Not to mention, there were also costs associated with managing and implementing boards 
of control (Grob, 1983).  Therefore, even though they may not have been as effective as 
intended, the establishment of the boards of control suggested that people were starting to care 
about institutional reorganization and structure.  Indeed, the boards of control began the overture 
for more patient-friendly and ethical therapeutic and rehabilitation practices (Grob, 1983).   
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It should also be noted that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the responsibility 
of caring for the mentally ill rested entirely with the state (Bell, 1989).  Therefore the state 
needed to find ways to make its hospitals more effective as they were not receiving any help, if 
at all, from the federal government (Grob, 1983).  In fact, by 1917 only a few remaining states 
still maintained that local communities aid them in providing financial support for the care and 
treatment of the mentally ill (Reamer, 1989).  To put things in perspective, consider that in New 
York, from 1918 to 1940, approximately 90% of the fiscal responsibility for the mentally ill lay 
with the state (Grob, 1983). 
By the 1920s treatment for illnesses had shifted from the magic and herbal remedies of 
the 1800s to scientific medicine.  As a result, most states increased their spending on the 
improvements being undertaken at public hospitals by approximately 60% (Grob, 1983).  A 
decade later, treatment of the mentally ill had also modified to a certain extent (Deutsch, 1946).  
By 1937, many state hospitals had created and set up farm communities connected to the 
hospitals (Deutsch, 1946).  This allowed certain patients to gain employment and that also in an 
environment conducive to their needs and medical conditions all the while permitting them to 
work with greater freedom than they could have otherwise been allowed (Deutsch, 1946).  There 
was also a differentiation in institutions such that in a number of states, patients were categorized 
and separated into groups based on mental capacity.  Those who were completely mentally 
deficient were taken out of mental hospitals and placed in institutions where their individual 
issues could be dealt with on a more specific and individual basis (Deutsch, 1946).  By 1938 
social work and occupational rehabilitative therapy had come to be introduced into institutions to 
help the mentally ill (Grob, 1983).  Mental hospitals also began to categorize and classify their 
patients into type and acuity of illness so that patients were not randomly assigned to their rooms 
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and care (Deutsch, 1946).  These modern hospitals began to include sessions of psychotherapy, 
occupational therapy, and hydrotherapy for their patients (Young, 2010).  Other mental hospitals 
also began to instantiate physical education, sports, rhythmic exercise, and other such 
recreational activities into their occupation therapy curriculum (Deutsch, 1946).  According to 
Deutsch (1946), by 1925 it seemed that an increased number of mental institutions were 
beginning to conform more rigidly to the rules established for mental institutions by the 
American Psychiatric Association. 
By 1948 most states had included provisions to prevent mentally ill patients from being 
rendered immobile by bondage techniques or being committed to solitary detention (Deutsch, 
1946).  Many states had begun to adopt laws that would limit the use of mechanical restraints to 
implementation only in times of surgeries and emergencies and that too for a limited time by the 
consent of an officer (Deutsch, 1946).  The utilization of powerful sedatives that would 
tranquilize the patient but also have adverse effects for the patient’s mental and physical health 
was slowly cut back (Deutsch, 1946).  At the same time by 1937, certain personnel changes were 
also occurring in the employment of mental facilities.  Around the same time, oppressive “cell 
keepers” were beginning to be replaced by custodial attendants who were also reinforced with 
trained nurses; these nurses not only provided alternative care but also sympathetic care 
(Deutsch, 1946).  In the late nineteenth century and up to the twentieth century, most 
superintendents of mental institutions were male, the majority of whom had no medical training.  
A certain shift occurred such that by 1937, more and more states required their superintendents 
to be physicians but, more specifically, to be physicians with psychiatric training (Deutsch, 
1946).  Competitive civil service examinations had also become more commonplace to facilitate 
the process of employing qualified health personnel in public mental hospitals (Deutsch, 1946).  
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Though, of course, by no means may it be asserted that things had improved so drastically for the 
mentally ill such that that they were now being afforded much better treatment as individuals and 
did not have to endure much suffering in mental institutions.   
It is of the utmost importance to note that not all mental institutions adhered to these 
“more-humane” rules established by the APA.  Because despite these so-called improvements, it 
was no secret that many institutions for the mentally ill were in fact abandoned prisons that were 
then reconstructed to allow for the reception of these new types of “inmates” (Deutsch, 1946).  
Many of the hospitals did not have proper ventilation or adequate heating and plumbing 
(Deutsch, 1946).  These hospitals still had “heavily barred window and conspicuously locked 
doors; high-walled “airing courts”; a lack of any recreational or occupation facilities, therapeutic 
or otherwise, forcing the patients into a deadly deteriorating, despairing idleness” (Deutsch, 
1946, p. 448).  Many of these institutions also did not provide well-balanced meals for their 
patients to consume; not only was a mental institution’s diet unhealthy, it was also completely 
devoid of any taste.  To top it off, many of these mental hospitals also freely used straitjackets, 
handcuffs, and other paraphernalia required for the restraint of mentally ill patients (Deutsch, 
1946).  Many hospitals also spent money trying to make the exteriors of their structures look 
appealing while completely ignoring the fact that they could have spent that money on the scarce 
beds or improving equipment necessary for the rehabilitation and therapeutic needs of their 
patients (Deutsch, 1946). 
In the first half of the twentieth century, mental hospitals suffered from excessive 
overcrowding (Deutsch, 1946).  To illustrate this point, consider a survey conducted by the 
National Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1933 of state institutions during the Great 
Depression.  Of the 104 hospitals that took part in the survey, “77 reported overcrowding, 27 
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found it necessary to close their doors against new admissions, while 65 were receiving 
commitments in excess of budget capacity” (Deutsch, 1946, p. 449).  A 1934 federal census of 
patients in mental institutions gave further credence to these statistics by reporting that there was 
an 11.2% overcrowding rate in these hospitals (Deutsch, 1946).  According to Deutsch (1946), 
ten states reported an even higher overcrowding rate in excess of 25%.  Some hospitals were 
overcrowded in an excess of 103.8%.  “In a two-year survey completed in 1933, Dr. John M. 
Grimes found that, in many hospitals, dining and living rooms, hallways, amusement halls, 
gymnasiums, porches, attics, and even hydrotherapy departments, were being requisitioned for 
sleeping quarters while dormitory aisles had been narrowed or eliminated entirely to make room 
for more beds” (Deutsch, 1946, p. 448).  In 1938 approximately 153 out of approximately 5,000 
general public hospitals admitted mentally ill patients (Grob, 1983).  In the 1920s and 1930s, 
state-funded mental institution was the first place to dump the mentally ill (Bell, 1989).  Mental 
hospital also became a relief agency of sorts and served the alternative purpose of nursing homes 
for the elderly who were not employed and whose families could not sustain them during the 
Depression (Grob, 1983).   
To make the already-formidable situation worse, the Great Depression had a major 
adverse effect on mental institutions such that many mental hospitals had to reduce their budgets, 
completely end some programs, and abandon plans for expanding their institutions (Bell, 1989).  
To illustrate the extent of the overcrowding that was experienced during the early part of the 
1900s, consider that from 1903 to 1940, the number of institutionalized mental patients increased 
from 150,000 to 445,000 (Grob, 1983). To deal with the overcrowding issue, many hospitals had 
begun to adopt a “family care” system.  In this system, certain patients with long-term mild 
conditions or those recovering from treatment were boarded with foster families.  Usually 
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hospitals paid approximately $4.50 a week per patient to these families (Deutsch, 1946).  In 1934 
the state legislature allowed for the allotment of up to $20,000 by each public mental institution 
for those mentally ill patients under the care of the State Department of Mental Hygiene so that 
each institution would be able to enact a system of family care for specifically chosen patients 
(Deutsch, 1946).  
Due to the economic recession of the Great Depression in the 1930s, typical building 
construction for mental institutions was either reduced or completely stopped (Deutsch, 1946).  
The cessation of these building constructions resulted in an exacerbation of the already 
overwhelming-overcrowding to an even greater extent.  To deal with the issue, many hospital 
systems began to participate in the parole system (Deutsch, 1946).  The parole system allowed 
for the transition of mentally ill patients in which, after they were released from public mental 
institutions, these patients were placed in half-way houses.  From these intermediate community 
houses, the patients would then be placed in selected foster homes chosen at the discretion of the 
state hospitals in each district (Deutsch, 1946).  Of course, the issue that then arose was that after 
patients left state hospitals, there was no system to ensure follow-up and after-care for these 
patients (Deutsch, 1946).  Another dilemma was that the families of these patients had been so 
hard hit by the Depression that they could not take these transitory patients back into their homes 
(Deutsch, 1946).  As a result, many mentally ill patients ended up imprisoned during the Great 
Depression (Deutsch, 1946).  
By the end of first half of the twentieth century, Albert Deutsch released a scathing 
review of mental health care in the United States in his 1948 book titled The Shame of the States.  
In the book, he discusses how individuals afflicted with mental illness deteriorated in the 
uninvestigated wards of state mental facilities, without being allowed access to proper care or 
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otherwise enduring painful therapies that had no real effect (Frank & Glied, 2006).  In one 
especially thought-provoking and disgust-inducing passage, he wrote of public mental hospitals 
as “buildings swarming with naked humans herded like cattle ... pervaded by a fetid odor so 
heavy, so nauseating, that the stench seemed to have almost a physical existence of its own” 
(Frank & Glied, 2006, p. 1).  Not only did Deutsch point to the overcrowding of mental 
hospitals, he also revealed that many of these same hospitals were severely understaffed 
(Cameron, 1989).  Deutsch also pointed out that in the early twentieth century, politics 
unnecessarily and unfortunately played a large part in the treatment of the mentally ill (1946).  In 
some cases incoming governors would remove experienced and highly qualified leaders in a 
pubic mental institutions, for example the superintendent, by reason of them not belonging to the 
ruling political party of the time or not sharing the governor’s political party (Deutsch, 1946).  
Take for example, the case of an efficient superintendent who was immediately replaced as head 
of a mental hospital by the governor.  The reason for his departure: the superintendent did not 
belong to the governor’s party and he was duly replaced by the chairman of the committee of the 
ruling political party (Deutsch, 1946).  In at least 14 states, many hospital employees were being 
forced to contribute to political funds as condition of their employment (Deutsch, 1946).    
To sum up the plight of the mentally ill in the early part of the twentieth century it should 
be sufficient to know that not only were they not being adequately rehabilitated, they were also 
removed from society, these so-called “civilized societies”, into the recesses of worn-out 
buildings that had formerly housed the bane of society, criminals (Young, 2010).  Mental 
hospitals were generally abandoned, as they were thought to harbor the degenerates or deviants 
of society.  According to Deutsch (1946), the need for psychiatrists and other mental health 
officials to validate their profession and its purpose to the general well-being of society overrode 
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the need to provide efficient and compassionate care to the mentally ill. Government officials, 
whether state or local, placed more emphasis on finding ways to transfer over the financial 
burden of paying for the care of the mentally ill to the federal government or other areas of the 
government so that they would not have to bear the burden; as a result, they did not pay much 
attention to the treatment of the mentally ill and policies that, on the outset were formulated with 
the goal of supposedly aiding the mentally ill, but in fact proved more harmful to them than 
useful (Grob, 1983).   
By the first half of the twentieth century for individuals living with mental illness, living 
conditions outside of the mental institutions were only slightly better.  Many individuals barely 
got by, living in squalor and poverty, with no real income and little hope that they could ever 
receive treatment (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Many mentally ill individuals who did not suffer the 
most serious forms of their illness could resort to requesting aid from clergymen or other friends 
and relatives, but overall their conditions were no better and they had no other way of surviving 
(Young, 2010).  Palliative care at the time included medication that was either addictive or had 
no effect whatsoever (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Patients who were financially well-off, and these 
were the minority, actually received care that was more compassionate in nature because they 
had the means for admission in a private institution or private home care.  The treatments, 
however, were just as inadequate and futile as those received by the less financially well-off 
(Frank & Glied, 2006). 
Public Policy with Respect to the Mentally Ill 
Mental health policy in the United States underwent striking modifications after the 
1950s (Rochefort, 1989).  After the Second World War, federal involvement in mental health 
care began to increase slightly (Bell, 1989).  Congress was first made aware of the success of 
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psychiatry in treating soldiers during World War Two and then lawmakers were further angered 
into action after finding out how many people in the United States suffered from mental illness, 
which translated into the National Mental Health Act of 1946 (Cameron, 1989).  With the 
passage of the National Mental Health Act of 1946, the federal government launched a program 
that would focus on three major areas: “Research on etiology, prevention, and treatment; training 
mental health personnel; and improving local and state services” (Bell, 1989, p. 109).  The 
passage of this act also resulted in the establishment of the National Institute of Mental Health in 
1946, which allowed mental health policy to be considered at the federal level (Rochefort, 1989).  
The National Institute of Mental Health started providing grants and financial aid to further 
research into mental illness, as well as providing financial aid to states so that they would start 
developing community-based health clinics to care for the mentally ill (Cameron, 1989).  The 
National Mental Health Act of 1946 played a large role in transferring the care of the mentally ill 
from general hospitals to community mental health centers (Reamer, 1989).  Despite all of this 
political reform meant to benefit the mentally ill, no real changes in mental institutions had been 
implemented until 1955 (Cameron, 1989).  This is because 1955 was the year in which 
populations in public mental institutions reached their zenith, with the total population of state 
and county mental institutions numbering approximately 559,000 (Grob, 1983).  Further 
investigation revealed that there had been 178,000 new admissions in 1955 alone (Rochefort, 
1989).  Once Congress got wind of these developments, it passed the Mental Health Study Act in 
1955 directing the National Institute of Mental Health to commission an inquiry into how the 
United States may deal with mental health issues moving forward (Bell, 1989).  The NIMH then 
formed the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (Rochefort, 1989). The findings of 
the Joint Commission led them to propose some changes to how mental illness had been 
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approached thus far (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The Commission presented ideas about how to 
modify the public hospital system so that no hospital could exceed occupancy of 1,000 beds 
(Brody & Englehardt, 1980).  The Commission also stipulated that each and every patient 
suffering from mental illness should be cared for as long as possible in the psychiatric wing of 
the state hospital and if further treatment was required, that a patient be transferred to a hospital 
with a maximum occupancy well-below 1,000 beds where there would be greater focus on 
treatment for the mentally ill (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The commission also promoted the 
creation “of community mental health clinics, with one clinic for each 50,000 persons, which 
would serve as a main line of defense in reducing the need of many persons with major mental 
illnesses for prolonged or repeated hospitalization” (Isaac & Armat, 1990, p. 75).  The 
Commission was quite emphatic in its view that mental health education was not to be included 
in the list of duties for these suggested mental health clinics (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The 
Commission also called for more funding from the federal government for the treatment of the 
mentally ill (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The Joint Commission proceeded to publish its findings in a 
study referred to as Action for Mental Health (Bell, 1989).  This study led to the passage of the 
Community Mental Health Act in 1961, which began the shift from treating mental illness in 
state mental hospitals to more community-based care (Bell, 1989).  After New York State passed 
this act, other states began to follow suit with their own version of this revision in mental health 
policy (Bell, 1989).  This act advocated the end of the construction of large mental institutions 
and called for the creation of community-based health centers (Grob, 1983).  
John F. Kennedy further fueled interest and investigation into the mental health care of 
the mentally ill in the United States (Rochefort, 1989).  In 1960 John F. Kennedy created a 
“Secretarys’ Committee” comprising of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and 
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others to reevaluate the Joint Commission Report and suggest ideas for change that the 
administration could follow through with in its term (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  In what was quite 
an ironic turn of events, the subsequent report argued to disregard everything that was presented 
in the Joint Commission Report (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The only recommendation that the Joint 
Commission Report posited and that this commission promoted was the creation of a mental 
health facility for each 50,000 populace; this new committee advocated the establishment of a 
new approach to health care and treatment instead of renewing previous hospitals and services as 
the Joint Commission had suggested (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  In this new approach the clinics 
would have a more encompassing role than was previously suggested by the Joint Commission 
(Grob, 1983).  One of these roles was not prevention, however, because as Kennedy suggested, 
“Prevention would result from strengthening community, social welfare, and educational 
programs to correct the ‘harsh environmental conditions’ that Kennedy declared are ‘often are 
associated with mental retardation and mental illness’” (Isaac & Armat, 1990, p. 77).  President 
Kennedy was also convinced that the care and treatment of mental illness in public hospitals was 
the issue, not mental illness itself (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The issue was later presented in front 
of Congress and resulted in the passage of the Community Mental Health Centers Act in October 
of 1963 (Grob, 1983).   
Shortly before he died, in 1963 President John F. Kennedy signed the Mental Retardation 
Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act into law, which would later 
become known as the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 (Bell, 1989).  This piece 
of legislation provided federal funding for community health institutions (Rochefort, 1989).  Of 
course, no one in the congressional hearings had bothered to ask what would happen to 
individuals and their after-care after they left these clinics, as Medicare and Medicaid Acts, 
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which would have aided them in paying for their care, had not yet passed (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  
The reason this legislation passed is that most Congressmen were more focused on saving 
money, meanwhile the Joint Commission had asked for a doubling and subsequent tripling of 
funds allocated to revitalizing existing institutions and further funds to aid research that would 
study and possibly find means to prevent mental illnesses (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  There were 
approximately 500,000 patients populating mental institutions in 1963 (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
Congress had only been thinking about trying to save the government from funneling money into 
mental hospitals to take care of those patients.  The Community Mental Health Centers Act of 
1963 failed to take into account the chronic patient, probably in some part due to the uninformed 
decision that institutions and the deplorable conditions in those institutions generally resulted in 
the handicaps for which mental illness had been made the scapegoat (Isaac & Armat, 1990).   
In 1963 the Community Mental Health Center Program was established under the 
management of the National Institute of Mental Health (Grob, 1983).  This program was 
supposed to extend and further develop “community-based mental health services by providing 
inpatient and outpatient services, emergency care, and consultation to community agencies” 
(Reamer, 1989, p. 23).  In turn the centers overseen by this program would provide everyone, 
regardless of age and type of mental illness, with the mental health services they needed 
(Reamer, 1989).  Essentially the Community Mental Health Center Program would oversee the 
construction of new community mental health centers, effectively abandoning the public mental 
institutions that were already in existence (Young, 2010).  What no one took into account was 
the fact that it would be easier to organize and improve existing public mental institutions instead 
of spending more on trying to build new centers (Reamer, 1989).  Perhaps unsurprisingly so, the 
Community Mental Health Center Program failed and in the 1970s the National Institute of 
 Mental Illness 18 
Mental Health developed the Community Support Program to provide assistance programs for 
the mentally ill (Isaac & Armat, 1990). 
Research, specifically the Joint Commission’s Action for Mental Health report, provided 
some insight into how mental hospitals operated and how their resident patients were treated, 
thereby leading to some significant changes in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Bell, 1989).  
Many mental hospitals revised their policies of patient punishment and began to put an emphasis 
on positive relationships between the in-house staff and patients (Bell, 1989.  Hospitals also 
began to instantiate treatment programs into their daily care of patients so that patients were no 
longer languishing in mental institutions without any hope of reprieve from their illness 
(Rochefort, 1989).  The innovation of chemical drugs to deal with mental illnesses also led to an 
increase in patient discharges (Bell, 1989).  To empty hospitals, the government began passing 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 and Aid to the Permanently and Totally 
Disabled (APTD), which began to serve the mentally ill in 1962.  Medicaid absorbed the costs 
for nursing home care (Young, 2010). 
Along with the Community Mental Health Centers, Medicare, and Medicaid Acts, the 
increase in deinstitutionalization in the 1960s to the 1980s was further fueled by the lawsuits that 
were brought up against public mental institutions (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  In the later part of the 
1960s through the mid-1980s, a group of young lawyers came together, formed the Mental 
Health Law Project, and raged a legal war on mental hospitals, portraying mental hospitals as 
areas of the mental health system where patients were neglected and instead of treating them, 
further made their patients sicker (Torrey, 2008).  Yet another factor that further aided 
deinstitutionalization was Supplemental Security Income, which was controlled by the Social 
Security Administration—a federal entity (Young, 2010).  Established in 1974, Supplemental 
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Security Income served as a substitute for the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled 
(Isaac & Armat, 1990).  The era of deinstitutionalization resulted in approximately 54% of 
mentally ill patients being discharged from mental institutions between the year of 1966 and 
1975.  As a result of deinstitutionalization, the number of residents in state mental institutions 
decreased from 559,000 to 120,000 during the years from 1955 to 1982 (Young, 2010).   
This era of deinstitutionalization had intensely regretful effects on mental patients.  It led 
to many patients being discharged without being re-hospitalized or receiving the proper care and 
treatment that was required for them to attempt to lead normal lives (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
During this time period, many mental patients were released from mental institutions unprepared 
to enter into their communities and uneducated about their life post-institution; other patients 
were discharged into nursing homes which were completely uninformed about the treatment and 
care of patients suffering from mental illness (Grob,  1983).  During this era of 
deinstitutionalization, approximately 40 state mental institutions were shut down altogether 
(Torrey, 2008).  As a result, since many of the mentally ill had no place to go after they were 
removed from institutions and because Supplemental Security Income did not necessarily have a 
valid after-care program, many of the mentally ill wound up on the streets, homeless, or 
incarcerated (Young, 2010).  After deinstitutionalization had become more prevalent in the late 
1900s, there was a significant increase in the mentally ill rendered homeless, imprisoned, and 
victimized (Torrey, 2008).  There was also a significant increase in the number of assaultive acts 
perpetrated by discharged patients (Torrey, 2008).  A survey conducted by the New York State 
Office of Mental Health from 1979-1980 discovered that approximately 23% of mental 
institutional patients had been discharged but with no idea as to where these individuals had 
ended up.  This number turned out to be a shockingly high 59% for one specific hospital (Isaac 
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& Armat, 1990).  In 1985 a study checked up on 132 individuals who had been discharged from 
a public mental hospital.  In six months’ time, more than one third of the group wound up on the 
streets (Isaac & Armat, 1990).   
In 1983 there were approximately 116,236 residents in mental institutions, which was a 
79% decrease from the 559,000 in 1955 (Reamer, 1989).  There were also approximately 322 
mental institutions open for service in 1950; comparatively in 1984, that number had declined to 
277 (Reamer, 1989).  With a decline in public mental hospitals, general hospitals had begun to 
offer psychiatric services to patients (Cameron, 1989).  New York State passed measures to 
reduce psychiatric beds from the current number of 20,000 in 1986 to 13,000 in the next decade 
(Rochefort, 1989).  The number of psychiatric beds had decreased to 15,000 by 1989 (Young, 
2010).  This resulted in mass maltreatment of the mentally ill such that many of them ended up 
in the hallways or emergency rooms of city hospitals, waiting for beds while being handcuffed to 
their beds or wheelchairs for days (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  By the late 1980s, only one out of five 
individuals suffering from mental illness was treated for mental illness when comparatively, 
approximately 57% were seen by their regular physician (Reamer, 1989).  The early 1980s also 
saw an increase in total private psychiatric hospital beds (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Of course, only 
those who could afford it occupied these private beds (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Most mentally ill 
patients were being cared for by family members who obviously did not have the adequate 
training necessary or the proper treatment equipment to care for them (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  
Furthermore the distress and agony of the mentally ill had not been made public to such a degree 
that a joint CBS-New York Times survey in 1986 revealed that a shockingly low 1% of those 
surveyed were of the opinion that mental illness was a significant health issue even though at the 
time schizophrenia constituted approximately 40% of all chronic care hospital beds (Isaac & 
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Armat, 1990).  By 1989, approximately 20% of the population in the United States was suffering 
from mental illness (Rochefort, 1989).  A Johns Hopkins University Medical School study 
discovered that at least 42% of the men and 48.7% of the women of the homeless population 
suffered from mental illness (Isaac & Armat, 1990).  At the same time in 1990, the number of 
mentally ill individuals being treated in mental institutions roughly equaled the number of 
mentally ill patients languishing in prisons (Isaac & Armat, 1990).   
Some argue that by the end of the first half of the twentieth century, society and the 
government of which it was comprised, had not yet established an efficient system to provide the 
mentally ill in society with the proper care and treatment that they needed without being bogged 
down in legislation and politics (Frank & Glied, 2006). In 1999, an estimated 20% of 
incarcerated individuals in state jails and 11% in county prisons were suffering from serious 
mental illnesses (Torrey, 2008).  It is equally ridiculous that the Department of Corrections 
seemed to be the major provider of mental health care services to the imprisoned in California as 
evidenced by the fact that in 1993, an estimated $21 million was spent on mental health care in 
California prisons (Torrey, 2008).  This number ballooned up to $245 million in 2003 (Torrey, 
2008).  By the late 1990s, there were approximately 40,000 blatantly dangerous individuals 
suffering from mental illness who had a history of violence and who were capable of 
perpetrating violence unless they took their medication (Torrey, 2008).  Of course it is quite 
obvious that if they are not supervised, these mentally ill individuals will probably not take their 
medication; therefore when any one of these dangerous individuals was released into the general 
public, they had the potential of proving to be dangerous to society (Young, 2010).  Take for 
instance, the case of Andrew Goldstein, who had only been released from a mental hospital three 
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years prior to murdering Kendra Webdale in 1999, a woman with whom he had no prior 
association (Torrey, 2008).  This further highlights the lack of uniformity in commitment laws.   
Though some states have outpatient commitment laws, where highly mentally ill 
individuals who have violent tendencies are bound de jure to take their medication under threat 
of compulsory commitment, many other states, including Maryland, do not have such laws so 
that individuals like Malcoum Tate were able to terrorize their families with no reprieve and no 
law requiring him to be hospitalized or to take his medication (Torrey, 2008).  Studies reveal that 
400,000 individuals suffering from severe mental illness refuse their medication on an almost-
daily basis (Frank & Glied, 2006).  One method used to encourage mentally ill individuals to 
take their medication is the assisted outpatient treatment, or AOT, program (Torrey, 2008).  This 
program releases mental patients from psychiatric facilities on the condition that they take their 
medications and follow their general treatment regimen (Torrey, 2008).  Only 42 states have 
implemented AOT into their legislation but not all of them utilize it as they should.  Consider, 
for example, that in New York State an alarmingly low 6,013 mentally ill individuals have used 
AOT between the years of 1999 through the middle of 2007 (Torrey, 2008).  This is problematic 
because AOT has proved most helpful in decreasing homelessness, incarceration, and violent 
behavior among the mentally ill (Torrey, 2008).   
Even today, mental illness can lead to homelessness, and it often does, as well as 
imprisonment.  It was calculated that approximately 30% of homeless single adults are suffering 
from grave mental illness in 2000 (Frank & Glied, 2006).  President George W. Bush’s New 
Freedom Commission of 2003 reported “that the mental health system is ‘in shambles’.  The 
report described excessive disability, homelessness, dependence on social programs, school 
failure, and incarceration in jails and prisons of the mentally ill” (Frank & Glied, 2006, p. 2).  
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Consider the statistic that in 2002, an estimated 3.2 million patients suffering from mental illness 
were receiving Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability Insurance (Torrey, 
2008).  In 2005, approximately 20% of individuals suffering from schizophrenia in San Diego 
were homeless; that number was 17% for those suffering from bipolar disorder (Torrey, 2008).  
The population of mental institutions was estimated to be 40,000 in 2006 (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
By 2006, approximately 12.8 million adults were living with serious mental illnesses (Torrey, 
2008).  Even in 2006, “people with mental illnesses may lose many of their civil rights and their 
liberty, either through civil commitment or by being arrested for minor crimes arising from their 
erratic behavior” (Frank & Glied, 2006, p.3).   
What is alarming is that mentally ill individuals are still being incarcerated today.  
According to Gallagher, “The demographic characteristics of the mentally ill in state adult 
correctional facilities are roughly equivalent to the characteristics of the mentally ill in society as 
a whole” (2002, p. 19).   The result of the shift in the role of the prison into a mental hospital has 
resulted in approximately 283,800 inmates with critically serious mental illness, which is roughly 
16% of the total jail population (Gallagher, 2002).  Therefore it should be of no surprise that the 
United States has the highest rate of incarceration for nonpolitical offenders (Gallagher, 2002).  
Though the Justice Department stated in 1999 that incarcerated inmates suffering from mental 
illness were more likely than other prison inmates to have perpetrated violent offenses, it should 
be noted that the most common charge for these mentally ill individuals was disorderly conduct 
and public nuisance (Gallagher, 2002).  Sending individuals afflicted with mental illness to 
maximum-security prisons like Rikers Island in New York City is not only nescient and callous 
but also highly cruel and uncompassionate (Gallagher, 2002).  Aside from this objectionable 
trend, there are also some unsettling facts about the mentally ill in adult correctional facilities.  
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One of these is that law enforcement officers have come to play a progressively greater role in 
dealing with mentally ill individuals and are now even playing a role in making decisions about 
the patients regarding psychiatric referrals (Gallagher, 2002).  It should be noted that, quite 
obviously, law enforcement officers and individuals involved in the legal aspect of making these 
referral decisions, such as judges, are not qualified to either recognize or handle individuals 
suffering from mental illness (Gallagher, 2002).  
Today, even though most people suffering from mental illness may receive financial aid 
through public social programs or private insurance, that aid may not be enough to offset the 
costs of treatment (Frank & Glied, 2006).  At the same time, health insurance programs also tend 
to levy restrictions on treatments, such as the allowed number of hospital or outpatient visits 
(Torrey, 2008).  These insurance agencies also tend to balk at certain name-brand drug coverage.  
Therefore, insurance coverage may result in extreme financial hardship for some individuals, 
especially those suffering from severe mental illness (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Those suffering 
from mental illness are also suffering from the worst unemployment rates of any category of 
disabled individuals (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Mentally ill individuals also tend to have the lowest 
earnings of any groups and their rate of going back to work is also lower than other handicapped 
individuals (Frank & Glied, 2006).  To put things in perspective, consider a report by the World 
Health Organization, which computed that “mental illnesses lead to a greater collective disability 
burden in established market economies than does any other group of illnesses, including cancer 
and heart disease” (Frank & Glied, 2006, p. 2).  Those afflicted with mental health issues also 
tend to comprise the highest occupancy in public social insurance assistance.  It was calculated in 
2001 that the mentally ill “account for up to 35% of those on public disability and 28% on 
welfare rolls” (Frank & Glied, 2006, p. 2). Even with regular payments from public social 
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insurance programs, the financial aid is not enough to raise these individuals over the federal 
poverty guidelines (Frank & Glied, 2006).   
Though care for the mentally has become more accessible, some people do not receive 
that care because the individuals tasked with distributing aid to the mentally ill may not 
necessarily identify health issues of the mental nature in an individual, thereby not referring 
patients to the programs from which they could benefit (Callard et al., 2012).  Other times, 
people do not seek help for mental issues because of the stigma and shame attached to mental 
illness or the because of a bad previous experience (i.e. lack of courtesy or competency, etc) with 
mental health service personnel (Callard et al., 2012).      
Despite these fear-inducing statistics, there was an increase in spending on mental health 
services, as well (Young, 2010).  An estimated $3.3 billion was expended on mental health 
services in 1969 but in 1983 this number had increased to $19.9 billion (in 1969 dollars) 
(Reamer, 1989).  Psychiatric facilities for underage children were also established by the late 
1900s (Reamer, 1989).  It was estimated that between 1970 and 1981, there was an increase in 
the number of psychiatrists from 21,150 to 28,500 (Reamer, 1989).  There was purported to have 
been an even bigger increase in psychiatric healthcare professionals in the 1990s, which 
subsequently led to an increase in the palliative care options available (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
Primary care physicians also began to take part in their mentally ill patients’ treatments instead 
of instantly referring them to mental institutions (Frank & Glied, 2006).  With the passage of the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 1972, the government could now provide disability 
assistance to those who needed it (Cameron, 1989).  This proved to be immensely helpful to the 
mentally ill—especially those who were not able to hold a steady job due the severity of their 
illness—who were now able to have a steady source of income for the first time (Frank & Glied, 
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2006).  This piece of health reform allowed patients to directly receive their money instead of it 
going directly towards the source of their health care services (Frank & Glied, 2006).  In 1990 
the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, which included stipulations for those suffering 
from mental illness, was passed (Gallagher, 2006).  This legislation required employers to make 
suitable adjustments so that the mentally ill could work in a variety of settings allowing the 
mentally ill to not only obtain jobs that they could not have before but also making it easier for 
them to hold down jobs (Frank & Glied, 2006).  By the late 1900s, many mentally ill patients 
had the choice of living in psychiatric group residences, which were able to accommodate these 
patients by providing them with a place to stay along with surveillance and supervision from 
staff at these residences (Reamer, 1989).  These patients also had the option of outpatient 
services where they did not need to stay in a facility but only needed to come in for counseling 
and treatment as per their individual needs (Reamer, 1989).  In the last half of the twentieth 
century, a spectacular modification took place with respect to how the United States began to 
approach the necessities of the mentally ill.  In fact, as a result of those changes many mentally 
ill individuals, including those who suffer from the most critical versions of their mental illness, 
do not have to be subjected to state mental institutions today (Frank & Glied, 2006).    
Today nearly all of the individuals who suffer from mental illness have palliative care 
available to them and even if the treatment should prove to be ineffective, it is almost never 
inhumane (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Instead of living in squalid slums, today the living conditions 
of those affected with the most critical forms of their illness has improved as much as the quality 
of living conditions has improved for society in general in the last half century (Frank & Glied, 
2006).  Whereas they had no reliable source of income before, today most mentally ill 
individuals, if they are not able to work, are entitled to obtain steady income from federal 
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programs (Frank & Glied, 2006).  The medical care for these individuals is also paid for by 
either private or public insurance programs (Frank & Glied, 2006).  The average expenditure for 
the care each mentally ill individual obtains has increased more than two-fold (Frank & Glied, 
2006).  Today, individuals with mental health issues and their families are more likely to receive 
financial aid services to help pay with the cost of treating those illness (Frank & Glied, 2006).   
In fact “a small army of specialty-trained psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, and social workers, 
who collectively number more than two hundred thousand, has replaced the seven thousand 
psychiatrists practicing in 1950” (Frank & Glied, 2006, p. 2).   
Whereas many family practitioners had mostly disregarded the mental health issues faced 
by their patients before, family practitioners today actually take part in the care that their patients 
receive for any mental illness they might suffer from (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Individuals 
afflicted with mental health issues actually have more civil liberties to the extent that the law has 
reestablished their sense of dignity by passing legislation which prevents mentally ill patients 
from being committed to mental institutions without their informed consent (Frank & Glied, 
2006).  Essentially, the mentally ill cannot be pushed into public mental hospitals by their 
families and society in general who do not wish to deal with them (Frank & Glied, 2006).  As a 
result, most mentally ill individuals lead lives in conditions that surpass the squalid living 
conditions endured by mentally ill individuals approximately 50 years ago (Frank & Glied, 
2006).  An increase in psychiatric palliative care has resulted in increasing the ability of 
psychiatrists to provide their patients with the most effective treatments (Callard et al., 2012).  
The research, therefore, indicates that even though there has been a great degree of improvement 
in the care and treatment of the mentally ill, that things are not yet optimal to the extent that the 
mentally ill may enjoy a life just as any other so-called “normal” individual may. 
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The Law with Respect to Mental Illness 
Lawmaking is imperative in the battle against prejudice, inequality, and the mal-
treatment suffered by the mentally ill (Callard et al., 2012).  With respect to the mentally ill, laws 
in the United States have mainly been passed as a way to differentiate between criminal 
accountability and criminal nonaccountability (Gallagher, 2002).  What differentiates these two 
entities is “intent” (Gallagher, 2002).  Criminal accountability takes into account the criminal 
intent of the individual (Gallagher, 2002).  This is known as mens rea, which encompasses the 
idea of deliberate malignity and an understanding of malevolence or ethical wrongdoing (Brody 
& Englehardt, 1980).  “Criminal nonresponsibility, on the other hand, involves two broad 
categories: immaturity and insanity” (Gallagher, 2002, p. 27).  The immaturity category relates 
to the mental age of the individual.  For instance, an individual who has not yet reached legal 
maturity or an individual who is developmentally challenged would not have a comprehension of 
the unlawfulness of an act (Gallagher, 2002).  Insanity, on the other hand, is a legal term that has 
not been fully developed in psychiatry (Gallagher, 2008).  It usually applies to cases in which 
individuals are suffering from a critical mental condition in which they have lost all touch with 
reality (Gallagher, 2002).  This extreme form of mental derangement would allow an individual 
to be exculpated of his crime (Gallagher, 2002).   
It should be noted that many of the standards utilized to establish insanity were primarily 
developed in the 1800s but are still employed today in a variety of states (Gallagher, 2002).  One 
of the tests of insanity is the M’Naghten Rule (Deutsch, 1946).  This ruling was developed to 
establish a distinguishing difference from the so-called “insane” people who perpetrated a legally 
punishable offense and a psychologically proficient individual who committed such an act 
(Gallagher, 2002).  This rule was a result from an 1843 case tried in England which related to a 
 Mental Illness 29 
Scottish individual, Daniel M’Naghten, and the accusation raised against him of murdering the 
secretary to Sir Robert Peel, Edward Drummond (Deutsch, 1946).  M’Naghten was impelled by 
his psychological delusion that Tories were out to get him; nine physicians attested to 
M’Naghten’s insanity and he was acquitted (Brody & Englehardt, 1980).  Queen Victoria of 
England, however, was quite disappointed by the verdict and retaliated by establishing a 
committee tasked with reappraising the case (Gallagher, 2002).  Those 15 judges soon 
established the M’Naghten Rule, which necessitated that a minimum of one of the following two 
criteria be fulfilled in establishing mental insanity: there has to be perplexity in the character of 
the act committed (i.e. the individual thinking his murder victim is an animal) and the individual 
is not capable of comprehending the illegality or the incorrectness of the nature of the act 
(Deutsch, 1946).  Of course, the second part of this rule may lead to further confusion.  For 
instance, there are mentally deranged people who understand the wrongfulness of their acts but 
do not necessarily concern themselves or are not bothered by the morality of their acts because 
they do not have a conscience (Gallagher, 2002).  As a result, under the M’Naghten Rule, these 
individuals are sent to prison rather than a mental institution where they might be rehabilitated.  
Of course, studies have also revealed that those individuals who lack a conscience are very rarely 
capable of rehabilitation.  An example would be sexual predators and those suffering from anti-
personality disorders (Gallagher, 2002).   
The basis of the M’Naghten Rule is that every individual is assumed to be mentally sane 
unless proven otherwise (Deutsch, 1946).  To successfully establish a defense based on insanity, 
the defendant’s legal team has to provide evidence that in the instance in which the individual 
was committing the criminal act, the individual was “laboriously under such a defect of reason as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he [or she] was doing, or if he [or she] did know it 
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as not to know that what he [or she ]was doing was wrong” (Ellsworth, 1980).  Another test of 
insanity is irresistible impulse (Deutsch, 1946).  Developed in 1887, this test is always used in 
juxtaposition with M’Naghten’s test (Brody & Engelhardt, 1980).  In this case, defendants may 
not be held liable for the criminal act if they have lost the ability and self-control to stop 
themselves from committing the act, even if they possesses the knowledge that the act was 
wrong, as required by M’Naghten’s Rule (Ellsworth,1980)).  Of course, one of the governing 
principles of this ruling is that the individual must have been induced into a homicidal and 
violent rage as a result of a brain anomaly (Gallagher, 2002).  It should be noted that this 
standard of insanity is not widely utilized today because of the dilemma of distinguishing 
overwhelming and compulsive impulse due to brain anomaly  from the impulsivity caused by a 
liable self-desire to do wrong (Brody & Engelhardt, 1980).  In legal instances where a culpable 
homicide occurs due to a neurological abnormality, such as a seizure, it would stand to reason 
that the individual would be exonerated (Gallagher, 2002).   
By the late 1930s, the mentally insane were legally distinguished and categorized into 
three groups: the criminally insane, the insane criminal, and the dangerous insane (Deutsch, 
1946).  The criminal insane category was comprised of those individuals whose violent 
tendencies were a result of their mental illness (Deutsch, 1946).  Meanwhile the insane criminals 
were the individuals who developed a mental disorder as a result of their incarceration (Deutsch, 
1946).  The dangerous insane were those individuals who did not previously commit any crimes 
but were thought to be capable of committing crimes (Deutsch, 1946).  It should be noted that 
there was no clear distinguishing factor between the insane criminal and the criminally insane as 
the two terms began to be used interchangeably (Gallagher, 2002).  
 Mental Illness 31 
As a result of the disagreement over the completeness and overall twentieth century 
applicability of the M’Naghten and Irresistible Impulse Rules, in 1954 the United States Court of 
Appeals established the Durham Product Rule in a ruling between Durham v. United States 
(Ellsworth, 1980).  Judge David Bazelon originated the use of this test to measure insanity 
(Gallagher, 2002).  He thought that the previous two tests of insanity left no room to use 
scientific erudition and therefore came up with this test in which offenders are not legally liable 
for their unlawful acts if the act was a result of “mental disease or mental defect” (Ellsworth, 
1980, p. 105).  This ruling also drew some criticisms because even though it was created to 
increase the involvement of psychiatric attestation, it really created more confusion as a result of 
the ambiguity of the terms “mental disease” and “defect” since neither terms were further 
elaborated upon or expounded (Brody & Englehardt, 1980).  As a result, if any of these issues 
were brought up in court each testifying psychiatric professional would have been able to defend 
his own definition of these terms (Gallagher, 2002).  Prior to the generation of this test, however, 
an individual could potentially be found guilty if the person suffered from mental illness 
(Ellsworth, 1980).   
The most recent of any of these rules regarding the insanity defense is the American Law 
Institute Rule, which was established in the late 1960s by the American Law Institute as a 
supplement to its Moral Penal Code (Gallagher, 2002).  Per this rule, offenders can be held 
legally liable for criminal acts if they cannot distinguish between right and wrong or had lost 
power to control themselves so as not to be able to refrain themselves from committing the act 
due to a mental disease at the time that the act was being committed (Ellsworth, 1980).  In its 
original wording this rule stipulated that “a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he [or she] lacks substantial 
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capacity to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his [or her] conduct or to conform his [or 
her] conduct to the requirements of the law” (Gallagher, 2002, p. 29).  This rule ensured it was 
generally understood that ‘mental disease or defect’ did not excuse recurring criminal behavior 
(Brody & Englehardt, 1980).  The American Law Institute Rule basically included many of the 
finer points of the previous rulings but it also freed the criteria for the basis of the insanity 
defense: while the “conformity of conduct” standard is reflective of the irresistible impulse, the 
“appreciation of criminality” is representative of the “wrongfulness” of the M’Naghten Rule, and 
the “mental disease or defect” allows for the criterion of the Durham Product Rule (Gallagher, 
2002).   
In order to help the mentally ill, in 1978 the New York State Department of Mental 
Hygiene generated the diminished capacity test.  By utilizing this test the defendant’s legal 
representation may prove that the defendant suffered from a mental defect so as to decrease the 
crime to a lesser offense, thereby reducing the amount of time spent by the accused in prison 
(Ellsworth, 1980).  It should be noted that the basic assumption of all of these rules and tests is 
that mental disease or defect has altered the individuals’ behavior and caused them to lose 
control over themselves so that essentially a common jury will decide if the individuals truly 
suffered from a mental illness which caused them to act in a legally and morally deplorable 
manner (Ellsworth, 1980).   
Despite these laws regarding the mentally ill and their role in the criminal justice system, 
by the end of the first half of the twentieth century mental illness could not be used as grounds 
for excusing criminal behavior and as a result, it did not exculpate an individual from criminal 
liability (Ellsworth, 1980).  Section 1120 of the New York State Penal law promulgated that 
individuals could not be assoiled from criminal responsibility as insane individuals if proof was 
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not provided that they were suffering from a deficiency in logic which would prevent them from 
understanding not only what they were doing but also that the act they were committing was in 
fact ethically and morally wrong (Deutsch, 1946).  Heinrich Oppen outlined the canonic 
fundamental aspects of all such criminal trials debating the mental health of the defendant by 
stating that at first, everyone is assumed to be sane and even if they are proven to be otherwise, 
they must still live up to the touchstones of the law (Deutsch, 1946).   
With respect to criminal trials concerning the mentally ill, though most states enacted 
legislation that allowed the courts to appoint experts, there was no set process adopted by all the 
states as to the mental examination of a defendant to ascertain his insanity (Deutsch, 1946).  
Generally, in the 1930s if a plea of insanity was made in Louisiana, the judge would notify the 
Commission of Lunacy, which included the parish coroner and the superintendents of the two 
state hospitals (Deutsch, 1946).  In other states, the issue of insanity would be decides before 
other issues but in California, the issue of insanity was tried after a verdict was reached regarding 
other issues on which the defendant was being taken to court (Deutsch, 1946).  Yet in some other 
states, prior legislation asserted that a panel of physicians be commissioned to determine insanity 
(Deutsch, 1946).  This committee would only act as counsel to the court but the final decision lay 
with the court or jury, depending on whether the case was a misdemeanor or felony case 
(Deutsch, 1946).  Meanwhile, a number of other states had laws in place that would allow them 
to consign the defendant to a mental institution, usually for a month, to determine insanity 
(Deutsch, 1946).   
Many psychiatrists raised countless objections to the idea that judgment on whether an 
individual really was insane was usually left to the jury to decide (Deutsch, 1946).  It would be 
extremely optimistic to expect that in 1938 a jury, composed of individuals who were most likely 
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not trained in the understanding of the complicated association between mental illness and to 
what extent it influenced someone’s judgment, to pass the correct judgment (Deutsch, 1946).  It 
should also be noted that these individuals probably also held their own personal stereotypes 
against the mentally ill (Deutsch, 1946).  To illustrate how useless it was to allow the jury to 
make this judgment, consider the 1927 Remus murder trial.  Remus represented himself and 
testimony from psychiatrists had declared him sane (Deutsch, 1946).  Remus, however, took the 
emotional route to the jury’s hearts by giving a poignant closing statement and bade the jury a 
Merry Christmas (Deutsch, 1946).  He was exonerated from guilt and admitted into a mental 
institution but was subsequently discharged a few months later (Deutsch, 1946).  “A member of 
the jury is reported to have explained the verdict in this wise: ‘He [Remus] did not have any 
Christmas last year, and we wanted to see him have one this year’” (Deutsch, 1946, p. 401).   
A few states also passed legislation vis-à-vis several court cases that it was permissible 
for the court to deem a defendant half-insane if he could not be declared fully-insane, such that 
that restricted liability would fall on him for the crime he committed.  It would therefore allow 
the individual to receive a lesser or reduced sentence (Deutsch, 1946).  
By the first half of the twentieth century, all states with the exception of four had 
stipulations in place regarding the mentally ill who had been acquitted based on a plea of mental 
irresponsibility (Deutsch, 1946).  These individuals, though spared from going to prison, were 
committed compulsorily to a mental facility with the provision that further inquiry into their 
mental state was not necessary for commitment (Deutsch, 1946).  If a court delivered a “not 
guilty” verdict by virtue of an insanity plea, the court had the authority to commit the individual 
to a mental institution if it determined that the individual truly was insane and a danger to self or 
others (Deutsch, 1946).  All the states had the law that the individual committed to a mental 
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institution on the plea of mental irresponsibility could be released from said institution if a third 
party, such as the superintendent of the institution, the board members of the institution, or the 
court provided grounds for their release—stating that the individual has recovered from their 
mental issues (Deutsch, 1946).  Suffice it to say that the law in the first half of the twentieth 
century was mainly concerned with punishment and the prevention of criminal acts by the 
mentally ill (Deutsch, 1946).  Care and treatment for the mentally ill was often secondary and not 
considered very important (Deutsch, 1946). Therefore in the first half of the twentieth century, it 
would be safe to say that the law was not especially interested in identifying insanity as an 
affliction or medical disease but rather the legal ramifications of the crime committed.  
Essentially, the law was interested only in finding out if the mental derangement of the alleged 
perpetrator extended to the degree that he was mentally compromised and could not be held 
legally responsible for the criminal acts he allegedly committed.  As a result, it is reasonable to 
assume that cases involving mental responsibility worked to understand how an individual’s 
mental defects or disease extended to impinge on that responsibility.  Therefore one comes under 
the impression that the law was more interested in mental capacity to determine punishment and 
not necessarily in the well-being of individuals to provide them with the care and treatment that 
they needed in order to overcome their illness so as to be able to become fully-functioning and 
contributing members of society (Deutsch, 1946).     
By the first half of the twentieth century, commitment laws were not in favor of the 
mentally ill.  The first step in the commitment process involved a petition that was filed by an 
individual(s) associated with the suspected mentally ill individual (Deutsch, 1946).  It was 
generally required that at least two physicians attest to the mental insanity of the individual to be 
committed by signing a certificate stating thus (Deutsch, 1946).  A legal notice was only 
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provided to the individual accused of being mentally ill if the judge did not think it would be 
unproductive and pointless to the proceedings (Deutsch, 1946).  The legal notice was not utilized 
if the judge thought it would prove to have adverse effects on the mental health of the allegedly 
insane individual (Deutsch, 1946).  The question of insanity was then addressed by a hearing in 
court.  Though some states did not require a hearing so as to save the individual from enduring 
an embarrassing and potentially painful procedure, a jury trial could be asked for by the 
individual or a relative of the individual (Deutsch, 1946).  The commitment procedure did 
require a medical examination of the individual by a court-appointed physician, with some states 
requiring that two independent physicians conduct the examination (Deutsch, 1946).  Some 
hearings also involved testimony from a psychologist, a lawyer, or a respected local individual 
(Deutsch, 1946).  If an insanity verdict was passed by a jury, a commission, or a judge, the court 
then proceeded to authorize the commitment of the individual to either a public or private mental 
institution (Deutsch, 1946).  In some instances, a relative or friend was given charge of the 
insane individual (Deutsch, 1946).  Paying for the costs of transferring an individual from his 
home to his place of commitment was usually the responsibility of the town or city where the 
individual resided (Deutsch, 1946).  Other times that cost was borne by the patient or relatives of 
the patient if they had the financial means to do so (Deutsch, 1946).  Needless to say, the 
commitment process was a long, and humiliating, one for patients who needed to be committed.  
Some states, however, did have laws in place for the temporary or emergency commitment of 
those severely mentally ill individuals who needed to be committed—though that commitment 
only lasted from approximately ten days to a month (Deutsch, 1946).  
The situation of the mentally ill with respect to commitment laws began to change in the 
late 1960s and 1970s (Gallagher, 2002).  It was during this time period that, encouraged by their 
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success in the civil rights movement, many justice-seeking individuals and groups began to focus 
their attention on other such voiceless entities such as the mentally ill, and began to speak out for 
them (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Many court decisions mandated that the mentally ill be active 
agents in their treatment and commitment choices so that they would not be subject to decisions 
without their approval (Frank & Glied, 2006)  As a result, mentally ill patients were further 
liberated from any restraints society could possibly try to impose on them (Brody & Englehardt, 
1980).  The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act or California Community Mental Health Services Act, 
passed in 1969, curtailed involuntary commitment to 17 days, unless the patient was proven to be 
an impending assaultive threat (Frank & Glied, 2006).  In such a case, however, the stay would 
be extended for an additional three months (Torrey, 2008).  This act was fueled by the anti-
psychiatric and anti-mental illness wave that swept the nation in the early 1900s and escalated 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Torrey, 2008).  The obvious issue with this law is that 
dangerousness is not always predictable.  With laws such as these, individuals who could 
become potentially dangerous were released into society (Frank & Glied, 2006).  An example is 
Herb Mullin, a schizophrenic patient who had been discharged multiple times because of the 
LPS Act and who proceeded to kill 13 people before he was caught and tried in 1973 (Torrey, 
2008).   His plea of insanity proved futile and the jury found him guilty of ten murders, thereby 
leading to a life sentence of imprisonment (Torrey, 2008).  Their reasoning: Mullin had been 
discharged five times from California mental hospitals and after his last discharge, he killed 13 
people, who was to say that he would not be discharged into the community again and commit 
the same acts again (Torrey, 2008)?  The LPS Act played a large role in the increasing number of 
mentally ill individuals who were discharged from mental institutions (Frank & Glied, 2006)  
Unfortunately, some of these individuals went on to commit crimes and had to be incarcerated 
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(Torrey, 2008).  Mental health care and commitment laws in California have utterly failed, in 
part due to the LPS Act, to such an extent that Frank Lanterman (the L in LPS) himself asked for 
the law to be changed (Torrey, 2008).   
When two young lawyer, Robert Blondis and Thomas Dixon, were appointed public 
defenders for Alberta Lessard, a paranoid schizophrenic who had been compulsorily committed, 
they decided to go big and filed a class action suit on behalf of everyone who had been 
involuntarily committed (Torrey, 2008).  This led to the Lessard decision in 1972, which 
rendered civil commitment legislation in Wisconsin unconstitutional and required that 
involuntary commitment only be used as a last resort when evidence of imminent dangerous to 
self and others had been established beyond reasonable doubt (Torrey, 2008).  The Lessard 
decision had “essentially reversed seven hundred years of English civil law that established the 
government’s responsibility to protect individuals who are unable to protect themselves, the 
principle of parens patriae.  Of course, the Lessard decision regarded mentally ill patients as 
individuals who were qualified and capable of deciding whether they needed treatment or not” 
(Torrey, 2008, p. 82).  As it may be obvious, establishing “dangerousness” is a complex task 
because if an individual is taking medication in a psychiatric facility, it would be easy to assume 
that the patient will continually take their medication.  That is hard to enforce after the individual 
is discharged, especially with the disorganized follow-up care system that takes effect after an 
individual leaves a mental institution (Frank & Glied, 2006).  Alberta Lessard herself is suffering 
as a result of the Lessard decision; she still suffers from schizophrenia, lives on Social Security 
Disability Insurance, and has endured periods of homelessness, as well as been charged with 
crimes, such as theft and disorderly conduct, as a result of her schizophrenia (Torrey, 2008).    
 Mental Illness 39 
By the 1970s and 1980s state legislations necessitated that individuals found not guilty 
with insanity as the major factor should be compulsorily committed to mental institutions 
(Ellsworth, 1980).  By the 1970s individuals in Massachusetts found innocent by reason of 
insanity were sent to the Hospital for the Criminally Insane, which was a subsidiary of the 
Department of Corrections, not the Department of Health, which would deal with the civilly 
insane (Ellsworth, 1980).  In general, the criminally insane were sentenced to a lifetime of 
commitment to mental institutions, which in the 1970s had a reputation as having living 
conditions worse than prisons (Ellsworth, 1980).  In fact, a documentary film highlighting the 
cruel living conditions of the Hospital for the Criminally Insane, titled Titicut Follies, was 
released in 1967 (Ellsworth, 1980).  The film showcased a comparison of the mental institution 
with a maximum security prison, with the institution coming out the loser (Ellsworth, 1980).  
The comparison revealed that the incarcerated in the prison lived a comparably better life than 
the committed, as their living conditions were far superior to those of the Hospital and the staff at 
the prison was more attentive to the needs of the imprisoned (Ellsworth, 1980).  As a result, it is 
not surprising that the insanity defense was rarely used.  Utilizing the defense could result in the 
offender being committed to horrid living conditions for the rest of their life whereas if they had 
not utilized the defense, the punishment for alleged crime would only result in a brief period of 
imprisonment in jails with much better living conditions (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
By the 1980s the courts required hearings after a verdict of innocence by reason of 
insanity to ascertain the offender’s mental condition so as to determine the length of 
commitment, if commitment was at all necessary (Ellsworth, 1980).  Court rulings also decided 
that a defendant could not be committed for life but that there would be periodic tests of the 
defendant’s mental status to determine whether further commitment was necessary (Gallagher, 
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2002).  At the same time, mental institutions had to provide beyond just the basic tutelary care of 
the committed but in fact, also had to provide treatment for those compulsorily committed 
(Ellsworth, 1980).  Many states have a one-year involuntary commitment procedure after an 
individual has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, after which period the defendant is 
further tested by psychiatrists to ensure that he is not a danger to self and others before releasing 
him (Ellsworth, 1986).   
The insanity defense has not been used as much as the contention regarding it would 
suggest (Gallagher, 2002).  The mass media especially publicize cases which hinge on the 
insanity defense—for example, the John Hinckley or the Jeffrey Dahmer cases—which polarizes 
the public and draws ire and criticism on whether mental ill-health may be utilized as 
exculpation for illegal acts of murder or other such heinous crimes (Gallagher, 2002).  Some also 
begin to question why mental institutions are used as warehouses for criminally violent or 
otherwise perilous individuals who are not capable of being healed of their dangerous tendencies 
(Gallagher, 2002).  The truth, however, is that the insanity defense is not easy to pull off and that 
is why defense lawyers use it as a last resort.  According to Gallagher (2006), many states have 
also significant reduced the allowed use of the insanity defense. 
The Stigma Associated with Mental Illness 
The ancient Greeks utilized the term “stigma” to refer to a manifestly physical sign on a 
person which attested to a negative aspect of an individual’s value or worth (Gallagher, 2002).  
Presently “stigma” is a term which pertains to the “disgrace itself” rather than the presence of 
any physical evidence of it on the individual (Gallagher, 2002).   Some claim that those “People 
who are or were mentally ill are stigmatized because they are deeply discredited for their failure 
to live up to societal expectations and are frequently rebuffed whenever they attempt social 
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intercourse” (Gallager, 2002, p. 302).  This begs the question: why has mental illness been so 
disposed to stigmatization?  The reasons for it vary but one outstanding factor in this 
stigmatization is fear (Gallagher, 2002).  Mental illness produces fear in individuals who are not 
familiar with it or who do not understand it.  As a result, when the media widely publicize the 
rare but violent incidents perpetrated by someone labeled as “mentally ill,” it serves to increase 
public perception of mental illness as dangerous (Corrigan et al., 2011).  Obviously psychopaths 
such as Charles Manson are mentally unbalanced in some way.  It should also be clear, however, 
that they do not truly represent how mentally ill people typically cogitate and behave.  When 
violent acts committed by the mentally ill are publicized by the media, it produces a public 
perception of “crazy” people as those who rant, murder, and rape whoever happens to cross them 
at the wrong time (Corrigan et al., 2011).  This is a highly subjective and prejudiced view of 
mentally ill individuals that completely contradicts the objective view or reality pertaining to 
those suffering from mental afflictions; that is, mentally ill persons are usually not violent or 
dangerous (Gallagher, 2002).  
Another major reason for the stigma and injustices that are heaped on the mentally ill is 
that mental illness is traditionally thought to result in the loss of logic and reason, which are the 
requirements for being considered a wholesome human being (Ellsworth, 1980).  Without these 
staples of humanity, people begin to perceive the mentally ill as something less than human.  
There is also a common misconception that mental illness is irresponsive to treatment, which 
results in the belief that the mentally ill are not capable of benefiting the society and as a result, 
useless (Gallagher, 2002).  Taken to the extreme, this view may also lead some to conclude that 
they should be removed completely from society (Callard et al., 2012).  The late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century gave rise to the eugenics movement (Ellsworth, 1980).  The eugenics 
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were devoted to enhancing the genetic nature of the American population by impeding the 
additional reproduction of objectionable or unwanted groups, such as the mentally ill, by means 
of sterilization (Grob, 1983).  By 1940, at least 30 states had passed legislation that prevented the 
mentally ill from procreating (Deutsch, 1946).  Consider the horrifying fact that from 1907 to 
1940, approximately 18,552 mentally ill individuals had been sterilized (Deutsch, 1946).  Even 
amongst psychiatrists, there was no clear consensus as to the desirability of sterilization, with 
some voicing concerns against it and others fully supporting it (Deutsch, 1946).  This further 
demonstrates and speaks to the lack of knowledge about mental illness to the extent that 
psychiatrists could not even agree about the factor of heredity in mental illness.   
As it has been stated before, the social stigma, and negative and destructive stereotypes 
and perceptions of the mentally ill have mainly been created by the mass media (Gallagher, 
2002).  The mass media strengthen the traditional and ignorant perspective of mental illness by 
reporting and highly publicizing stories in which the mentally ill have acted in a violent way 
when in fact, many ex-mental patients are less inclined to act in a destructive way or perpetrate a 
legal crime than those individuals who have never been diagnosed as mentally ill (Gallagher, 
2002).  Yet all the news media care about are ratings.  After all, mental patients who assault 
unassuming citizens make for more sensational news than ex-patients who have assimilated into 
society and who lead quiet and dignified lives (Gallagher, 2002).  One notices that the media 
harp on the psychiatric past of ex-patients while the non-psychiatric past of most criminals is 
handily disregarded (Gallagher, 2002).   
Unfortunately, the media has a profound effect on the opinions embodied by the general 
public.  This is evidenced by the fact that negative stereotypes created by the media of the 
mentally ill have been especially difficult to modify after years of prejudiced reporting by the 
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media (Gallagher, 2002).  In 1995, at the very end of the twentieth century, Otto Wahl published 
an insightful book on stigma called Media Madness.  Throughout his research, Wahl discovered 
that approximately 70% to 80% of the time, the media depict individuals suffering from mental 
illness as violent, bizarre, and fear-inducing (Corrigan et al., 2011).  This suggests that not much 
has changed when it comes to the media’s portrayal of the mentally ill.  Stereotypes about the 
mentally ill are not only perpetuated by the media but also by enterprising individuals and 
businesses.  For instance, in Halloween of 2004, Universal Orlando Theme Parks advertised that 
they were going to present the most frightening Halloween extravaganza (Corrigan et al., 2011).  
In their advertising and promotional marketing, they included straitjackets and committal forms 
for those journalists who were going to be covering the event (Corrigan et al., 2011).  In movies, 
such as Batman, the typical movie plotlines portray the confederates of evil as suffering from 
some sort of mental illness.  One of the most offensive things done by enterprising individuals 
who make money off of the stigma associated with mental illness involves these individuals 
buying a state hospital in Weston, West Virginia, and going so far as to name it the “Trans-
Allegheny Lunatic Asylum” (Corrigan et al., 2011).  One of the cheap gimmicks perpetrated in 
this former hospital allowed individuals to pay for the experience of being exposed to a so-called 
“dangerous” patient (i.e. an individual dressed up as a mental patient who proceeded to scream at 
and chase those who came to the hospital (Corrigan et al., 2011).   
As a result of the negative portrayal of the mentally ill by the media and/or other 
individuals, former mental patients have a hard time in their personal and professional lives.  
Many former patients “Report that the fact of their illness was used as a threat or ‘club over their 
heads,’ which blocked communication with friends and family, resulted in feelings of low self-
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esteem, and seriously diminished their chances for meaningful employment” (Gallagher, 2002, p. 
303).    
According to Gallagher, the extent to which an individual is stigmatized is often linked 
with the outward manifestations of the individual’s affliction (2002).  A significant feature 
includes the austerity of the illness; for instance, the phobic individual is not stigmatized to the 
same extent that the psychotic individual is (Gallagher, 2002).  This difference in degree of 
stigmatization occurs as a result of the outward physical manifestations of the illness, such that 
the more severe illnesses are generally accompanied by more violent, tumultuous, or strange 
behaviors that are thought to be observably more dangerous by others (Gallagher, 2002).  Yet 
another contributing factor in determining the extent of stigma experienced by a mental patient is 
the type of medical care they previously received (Corrigan et al., 2011).  Even though the 
degree of stigma experienced by an individual visibly declines after he has been discharged from 
the hospital, studies have revealed that those who were admitted to state mental institutions 
experienced more stigma than those who had been admitted to private hospitals (Gallagher, 
2002).  Those who were involuntarily committed also experienced more stigma (Gallagher, 
2002).  It should be noted, however, that those who needed to be committed were perhaps also 
exhibiting more visible manifestations of mental illness (Young, 2010).   
Despite the fact that there is still stigma associated with mental illness, it should be noted 
that ignorance regarding mental illness has slowly declined when compared to the decades past.  
After World War II many efforts have been made, especially by the psychiatric community, to 
inform the general public about mental illness, thereby hoping to reduce the stigma associated 
with the disease (Gallagher, 2010).  In previous decades, “Fear, stigmatization, and rejection 
strongly characterized public feeling about the mentally ill” (Gallagher, 2002, p. 304).”  The 
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public’s perceptions or beliefs about the mentally ill are segmented into two different positions: 
there are those who admit that society tends to put a stigma on mental illness and inevitably 
stigmatize those suffering from mental afflictions and then the second school of thought 
contends that society generally tends to acknowledge those suffering from mental illness and 
exhibit sympathy toward them (Gallagher, 2002).  The former school of thought is associated 
with the more traditional and stereotypical view of the mentally ill as strange and assaultive 
individuals (Gallagher, 2002).  The latter attitude is a nexus to the “psychiatric ideology” that 
perceives the mentally ill as ailing individuals who are capable of being healed and rehabilitated, 
similar to persons dealing with any other physical maladies (Gallagher, 2002).  In fact, studies 
conducted in the year 2000, though they revealed little modification in public perception, reflect 
the same trends discussed earlier with respect to public opinion about mental illness (Gallagher, 
2002).  Many of the studies also revealed that specific factions of the population, such as the 
younger individuals (especially college students), tend to adopt the psychiatric ideology 
(Gallagher, 2002). It should be noted, however, that these individuals who do not automatically 
stigmatize mental patients do not comprise the majority of the public.  Of course, the studies also 
indicated that being exposed to the psychiatric ideology does not necessitate an adherence to the 
view (Gallagher, 2002).  It is also really important to note that some times how people respond to 
these surveys is not necessarily the way they would actually behave in their daily life (Gallagher, 
2002).  Yet there is conflict when deciding if those who have come in contact with, or are 
somehow more knowledgeable about mental illness, are actually more tolerant and do not lean 
towards stigmatizing the mentally ill.  As Gallagher notes, “A sophisticated ideology may not 
necessarily imply a reduced tendency to stigmatize and tolerate psychopathology because 
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knowledge is intellectually based, whereas stigmatization is an emotional phenomenon” (2002, 
p. 306). 
The conventional view that allows for the stigmatization of the mentally ill is usually 
acquired during childhood and is unfortunately strengthened and amplified by the media 
(Corrigan et al., 2011). Typically the general public does not perceive the mentally ill to be really 
sick; they are only classified into a category of individuals who are fear-inducing and impervious 
to a cure (Gallagher, 2002).  Many wrongly consider those afflicted with mental illness, and thus 
distinguish them from those who are “really” physically sick, to be the casualties of their own 
debilitated natures and bad judgments (Gallagher, 2002).  Of course, this unfortunately ignorant 
perspective is not reflective of all groups of people.  In fact, many studies have revealed that 
social class has a profound effect on perceptions of the mentally ill (Gallagher, 2002).  This is 
because those individuals who are part of a high social class are more likely to be educated and 
through their education, would have come to realize that mental illness is truly a serious disease 
that needs to be considered (Gallagher, 2002).  Therefore, as the degree of higher education 
increases, the likelihood that an individual has composed a non-judgmental and more informed 
perspective of mental illness and mental patients increases (Gallagher, 2002).   
Yet the sense of shame associated with mental illness results in those individuals unjustly 
being deprived of their lawful possibilities available to them in their professional and personal 
lives—both categories comprising the ways in which a fulfilling life and living is obtained 
(Corrigan et al., 2011).  Many ex-patients also change residences and more to areas where their 
past as mental patients are not deduced by others, thereby allowing them to evade the stigma felt 
by those whose psychiatric history is common knowledge (Gallagher, 2002).  In fact, it is most 
common middle class families to move rather than try to put up with the combined pressure of 
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dealing with the visible manifestations of the ex-patient in the family and knowing that their 
neighbors are aware of the aberrance present in their ex-patient family member (Gallagher, 
2002).  Those ex-patients who do not feel stigmatized do not feel this threat because they are 
probably not open with others about their previous psychiatric history (Gallagher, 2002).   
In recent years, population-based stigma programs, such as public service 
announcements, have become more prominent, especially in the twenty-first century.  Public 
service announcements targeted towards outlining and decreasing the stigma of mental illness are 
generally exposed to a larger group of people.  As a result, they are efficient, to a certain extent, 
in their original goal (Corrigan et al., 2011).  In fact, a well-designed PSA has the potential of 
having a profound effect on people rethinking their previously-held traditional perspectives on 
mental illness.  Using celebrities and other such influential and publicly visible personalities is 
one of the best ways to gain attention for a PSA, as exemplified by previous PSAs.  An example 
of a PSA conducted to raise awareness about mental illness is that conducted by Glenn Close, a 
famous film personality (Corrigan et al., 2011).  The PSA included individuals donning white t-
shirts.  Half the actors’ shirts had the name of a mental illness inscribed on their shirts while the 
name written on the t-shirt of the individuals next to them included relationships, such as 
“mom,” “battle buddy,” or “better half” (Corrigan et al., 2011).  The PSA, titled “Change a Mind 
About Mental Illness,” was released on October 21, 2009 and proved to be a big success as it 
exposed many people to mental illness, including those who had either watched it on TV or 
through other such video-sharing websites as YouTube.  Of course, Close was a driving force in 
the popularity of the campaign as she is an internationally famous personality.  Celebrities such 
as Close have the unique opportunity of being able to reach a wider audience in all corners of the 
globe.  
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Apart from large-groups focused PSA there are also individual advocates who tend to 
make local groups of people or otherwise distinguished and influential individuals their 
concentrated focal point (Corrigan et al., 2011).  Concentrating on influential individuals, 
whether they are political or not, is really important because even if these individuals are not 
involved in politics, they can still provide financial aid in either helping those with mental illness 
or increasing awareness and thereby decreasing the stigma of mental illness. 
As one can probably deduce ,after this exhaustive research of the plight of the mentally ill 
in the United States since the twentieth century, things are certainly better but not as well as they 
possibly could be.  Whereas in the beginning of the twentieth century, the mentally ill were 
thought to be the degenerates of society and thus often abandoned in public mental institutions 
the government did not want to spend money on, things began to look up towards the later part 
of the century and towards the beginning of the twenty-first century (Frank & Glied, 2006).  
That, however, is not enough to erase the horrific conditions suffered by the mentally ill during 
the 1900s (Deutsch, 1946).  Many public mental institutions suffered from overcrowding and 
since public mental hospitals were paid for by the state, there was never enough funding 
available to provide adequate care to the abandoned and destitute of society (Isaac & Armat, 
1990).  There was even a period of time when theories circulated suggesting that mental illness 
was not real (Armour, 1989).  How could anyone possibly secure funding for a disease that was 
in contention as actually being a disease?  The mentally ill were viewed as deviants and lack of 
research into the affliction resulted in unforgivable actions, such as the sterilization of the 
mentally ill (Grob, 1983).  Treatment of the mentally ill in public institutions was not only 
inadequate but completely inhumane (Deutsch, 1946).  In fact, a few exposes indicated that the 
treatment of prisoners, supposedly the bane of society, were far more favorable than the 
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treatment of the mentally ill (Ellsworth, 1980).  Attempts to involve the federal government 
resulted in Congress passing legislation which would attempt to completely do away with mental 
asylums but relocate care for the mentally ill to community-based mental health centers vis-à-vis 
the passage of the Community Mental Health Centers Act in October of 1963 (Isaac & Armat, 
1990).  These community-based institutions also failed but had more negative far-reaching 
effects that were not anticipated in congressional hearings (Rochefort, 1989).  In effect, this Act 
along with lawsuits brought against mental hospitals and the passage of Medicaid and Medicare, 
gave rise to a period of deinstitutionalization.  The deinstitutionalization of the four-decade 
period between the 1950s and the 1970s to early 1980s resulted in many mental patients 
individuals ending up homeless or plagued by crime (Young, 2010).  As evidenced by research, 
thus far no program had been passed through to allow for adequate follow-up care for those 
individuals who had left mental hospitals.  Some mental patients began to pour into general 
hospitals to seek mental healthcare that they desperately needed (Reamer, 1989).  The law and 
public policy has also proved most unhelpful with respect to taking care of the mentally ill in this 
country.  There really has not been any new legislation that would keep the mentally ill out of 
prisons and off the streets and in institutions that would be able to offer the proper care and 
treatment that these individuals need.  There also does not exist any effective measures of 
making sure that mental patients take their medications, without which they are prone to 
behaviors that are not only not conducive to the well-being of the individuals themselves but also 
have the potential of adversely affecting those around the mentally ill individual (Torrey, 2008).  
Despite the fact that the United States is considered the epitome of civilized, modern, and 
technologically advanced, many of the mentally ill still live secretly despondent lives, have 
unmanageable feelings of inconsequentiality or fretfulness, typically cannot manage to hold 
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down a job as a result of such anxiety, and normally face such personal and social difficulties 
that it not only bears heavily upon them but on those around them, as well (Gallagher, 2002).  
Suffice it to say that negative stereotypes of the mentally ill and a lack of understanding of 
mental illness transgress on efficient care for those afflicted with the disease.  Why must these 
individuals who did not ask for their illness still feel the sting of stigma?  Though it is 
commonplace to read material that preaches change for mental patients, especially changes 
specifically geared toward reducing stigma, not much has been done.   
To deal with the issues discussed it is possible to suggest reform with respect to the care 
and treatment of the mentally ill and a change in public health policy.  The portrayals of mental 
illness in the media sustain one of the most damaging stigmas about the mentally ill.  That is, that 
mentally ill individuals are strange, violent, and prone to unprovoked violence and therefore 
should be shunned to prevent injury to unsuspecting bystanders.  Stigma has such a stronghold 
on the mentally ill that some have called the experience a “career” with long-run expectations 
and impossible hurdles.  Only recently have studies found that those individuals who employ the 
psychiatric ideology—that is, those who have a more tolerant view of the mentally ill—have 
developed this mindset through higher education (Gallagher, 2002).  To further increase this 
psychiatric ideology in the general public, we should produce more public service 
announcements through different mediums, including billboards, Twitter, and video PSA on TV, 
YouTube, and other such media sharing services.  The negative portrayal of the mentally ill in 
the media should be stopped, as it has adverse effects on the mentally ill.  There should be more 
public service announcements and the NIMH should implement policies to increase public 
awareness of the mentally ill. Since previous research has suggested that negative stigmas about 
the mentally ill first begin to form in childhood, the state government and schools should work 
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together to instantiate public education campaigns about mental illness for school-age children.  
If we work towards decreasing or preventing stigmas from forming as early as possible, then it is 
possible that the stigmatization of the mentally ill will decrease.   
The federal government should decrease the amount of effort, specifically financial 
effort, it is currently funneling to warfare and take up the task of allotting more funds to improve 
conditions for the mentally ill in public mental health institutions.  The National Institute of 
Mental Health should dedicate more research to mental illness and perhaps, as a result, come up 
with more ways for those suffering from mental illness to be able to manage their illness.  The 
NIMH should also conduct research into the most efficient and patient-friendly strategies to 
operate these mental healthcare facilities.  States need to implement policies that allow for public 
mental institutions to run in the most efficient ways possible.  These mental hospitals need to 
make sure that they hire individuals who are qualified to work with the mentally ill.  They also 
need to make sure that more than one independent healthcare professional, such as a psychiatrist 
or psychologist, agree on the diagnoses that they assign to patients.  Public mental institutions or 
general hospitals with psychiatric wards should be closely monitored, with unannounced visits 
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation, Healthcare, and Certification to further aid in the 
strategy of increasing efficiency and providing humane care.  As the research discussed in this 
thesis has shown, the commitment laws are outdated, with many individuals suffering as a result 
of them when in fact commitment laws should serve to protect the rights of the mentally ill.  If a 
patient needs commitment, more than one qualified psychiatrist or psychologist should 
independently evaluate them.  More states should compel their hospitals to implement assisted 
outpatient treatment (AOT) programs into their healthcare practicum.  The well-being of some 
mental patients very well depends on them taking their medication.  If they are not going to take 
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their medication, how can they control the symptoms that are not only disruptive to themselves 
but also to society in general? The mentally ill should not be thrown into prisons and jails like 
common criminals where their care will suffer with no qualified healthcare professionals to care 
for them.  The government needs to find ways to implement legislation that helps the mentally ill 
off the streets.  One way to get these patients off the streets and out of jails and prisons is to 
make sure they take their medication, which would be possible with more AOT-like programs, as 
has been suggested above.  Instead of funneling money into the Department of Corrections to 
care for the mentally ill, the government needs to find ways to bypass those lines and allocate 
funds so that the mentally ill who are prone to crime can receive the treatment that they need.   
The federal government should convene a commission that reports on the current state of 
mental health care in the United States.  The study findings should then be presented to 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and other healthcare professionals.  They should come together in an 
open forum to discuss the main issues and come up with possible solutions.  Then these 
individuals should subsequently present their findings and possible solutions to lawmakers.  The 
advantage in having these healthcare professionals meet before is that it would reduce the 
possibility of disagreements rising amongst healthcare professionals in front of Congress.  If 
Congress is presented a clear plan of action, though, of course that may just be wishful thinking, 
it is possible that healthcare professionals can convince them to not worry so much about 
budgeting costs but to implement policies and strategies that would provide better mental 
healthcare for the mentally ill.  
This, of course, will take time implement but someone needs to start somewhere.  We 
cannot let the people of this country go to waste; they must be taken care of and allowed to live 
as functioning and contributing members of society.  Mental illness should not be equated to 
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stupidity or the perception that the mentally ill cannot contribute to society.  We cannot afford 
more instances where the mentally ill are disregarded and ignored like they do not exist.  We 
cannot punish the mentally ill because they are individuals who are suffering from diseases that 
hold them prisoners.    
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